INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the question of convergence to rational expectations equilibrium. It has been claimed that agents can learn how to form rational expectations. Grossman and Stiglitz [5] write that, if expectations are not rational and the stochastic process of the underlying random variables is stationary, an individual will eventually observe that the frequency distribution of returns, conditional on the observable variables, is different from the subjective distribution, and accordingly, ought to revise his expectations.
This statement is very plausible. However, even if it is accepted, it does not imply that the revised expectations are rational, or even' that multiple revisions eventually lead to rational expectations. The difficulty is that in many models with rational expectations equilibria (including that of Grossman and Stiglitz [5] ) the objective distribution of variables depen upon agents' subjective beliefs about the distribution Outside a ratio expectations equilibrium the objective distribution of variables differs both from agents' subjective beliefs, and from the objective distribution which would prevail in a rational expectations equilibrium. Agents may learn about the relationship between variables, given their current behefs. However, when they modify their beliefs in the light of what they have learned, the relationship changes. Agents may attempt to learn about the relationship, using Bayesian or classical statistical techniques which are based on a correct specification of the rational expectations ~n~~~~~i~rn. In doing so they fail to take into account the dependency of outcomes on beliefs. Their estimation technique is based on a misspecification of the situation. For example, in the rational expectations equilibrium of the asset market model studied in this paper, the price and return on the asset at different dates form an i.i.d. sequence of normal random variables. In this situation ordinary ieast sqaares is an appropriate statistical procedure for learning price-return relationship. However, suppose that agents in the m IL% (or any other statistical procedure) to estimate the price-return lationship outside the rational expectations equilibriums and use their estimates in forecasting returns. The stochastic process of price and return Is then neither stationary, nor independent. The use of OLS e~t~rnat~o~ is inappropriate.
FulEy rational agents should estimate a correctly specified model, which takes into account the feedback from forecasts to outcomes. This is likely to entail a complicated learning strategy based on a considerable degree of understanding of the situation. Outside the rational expectations equilibrium, it is not usually rational to use estimation techniques which are based on a correct specification of the rational expectations equilibrium, such as OLS in the model considered here. Nevertheless the use of such techniques might be described as reasonable. The major propositions of this paper establish conditions, for the model presented here, under which 8LS estimation ultimately generates rational expectations.
The model is basically an infinitely repeated version of the rossman-Stiglitz [5, 61 model of an asset market with inbrmed and uninormed traders. As in the Grossman-Stiglitz model, the informed agents in this model know how to form rational expectations, given the information available to them. In the Grossman-Stiglitz model the un-nformed traders aiso form rational expectations about return, given the price. In this model, however, the uninformed traders lack the knowledge about the structure of their world needed to form rational expectations.
stead they estimate the price-return relationship from past history, using LS regre~ §ion~ and u.se their estimates in forecasting return from price.
Two learning processes are studied. In the first, agents revise the estimates used in forecasting return at infrequent intervals. In the second, they revise the estimates each time a new data point is observed. In both cases conditions are derived under which expectations are, in the limit, rational. The model is described in Section 2. Section 3 contains a discussion of the relationship between forecasts and expectations. The major propositions on learning are in Section 4. The nature of the parameter which determines whether the learning processes converge is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. See Blume et al. [ 11, for a discussion of the related literature.
THE MODEL
The model is simple and special. There are two types of traders, Ni 2 0 informed traders and N, > 0 uninformed traders. Both types of traders observe the market pricep, at t, and the return on the asset rt at a date after t but before t + 1. In addition the informed traders observe information I, at t. Information It may be a vector or a scalar random variable. The asset is supplied in quantity s, at t. Demand is a function of the asset price and of traders' point or mean predictions of the return. Under the assumptions of the model the informed traders need use only their private information It in forming predictions which are rational expectations, in the sense of being the correct conditional expectations of return given all the variables, past and present, observed by the informed traders. The uninformed traders forecast return from price on the basis of their estimates of the price-return relationship derived from past history using ordinary least squares. This is essentially an ad hoc specification of the demand function. However, it will be shown that the conditional distribution of rt given the information available to the informed' traders is normal with constant variance. The demand function can thus be derived from a constant abso~~~te risk aversion utility function, in which case 8; = l/[risk aversion x var(y, / N,-1, P,, pf>].
Note that the informed traders are assumed to have rational expectat~o~s~ The following assumption will be shown to imply that these expectations in fact depend only on I,. It will be shown that there are numers a* and b* such that, if a,_ i = a* and b 1-1 = b*, the forecast is the rational expectation, in the sense of being the correct conditional expectation of pt, given the information available to the uninformed traders at t. In these circumstances the conditional distribution of rf is normal with constant variance, and the demand is that which would be generated by a constant absolute risk aversion utiiity function. However, in general a,-r f a* and b,-, f b*, the forecasts using these co&cients are not in any sense rational expectations.
ASS~.JMPTI~N 5. It is common knowledge that the market clears, ana that the market clearing price pt is determined by supply s,, i~f~rrnatio~ 1:. and the past history of information, price and return H,-, .
Note that he history observed by the informed traders, M,-L 9 includes the history observed by the uninformed traders, hi-1.
FORECASTS AND EXPECTATIONS
The two propositions in this section clarify the nature of traders' forecasts and expectations. The market is said to be in temporary equilibrium at t if the asset market clears, in which case Note that in temporary equilibrium the uninformed traders do not, in general, form rational expectations. ProoJ Assumption 5 implies that the informed traders realize that pt is a function of H,-,, I, and st and so that E(r, 1 H,-1, It, s,, p,) = E(r, ) H1-1, I,, st). Assumption 1 implies that (It, rt, sJ is independent of past history Ht-1, and so that E(r, 1 Hf-1 , II, s,) = E(r, ) It, st) = E(r, IIt) (using Assumption 3). Thus E(r, 1 H,-1, I,, sI, p,) = E(r, / it). Taking conditional expectations over st given (H,-, , I,, pr) implies that E(r, 1 Hf-, , I,, pt) = E(r, 1 It). 1
An identical argument can be used to show that the conditional distribution of r, given (H,_, , I,, pt) is the same as the conditional distribution of rt given It. As (It, r,) is i.i.d. normal (Assumption l), this conditional distribution is normal with constant variance.
Proposition 1 makes it possible to write pr explicitly as a function using (3.1) and (3. The estimated regression coefficients a,-, and b,-, are functions of past history h,-1. From Assumption 1 they are independent of (It, rt, s,). The term X, is a linear function of (I,, rt, sJ. Thus (rt, xt) is bivariate normal and The variables {Us} form a sequence of i.i.d. normal random variables; U, is independent of past history and in particular of ai-I and bj-r. As (rt, x,) is normal, (4.2) implies that nt is independent of x1, If alPI and bi-, were constants over time equal to a; and b;, the conditions of both the Gauss-Markov theorem (Johnston [ 7] ), and the assumptions of Zellner [S] under which OLS constitutes a Bayesian learning procedure, would be satisfied. The regression coefficients when rl is regressed linearly on pt would converge in probability and almost surely to aA and b;. If the initial forecast rule yielded rational expectations, (a, = a* and b, = b*), OLS estimation would confirm that the expectations were rational, as in this case ai = a* and b; = b*. An outside observer could appropriately use OLS to estimate the price-return relationship in repeated realizations of the rational expectations equilibrium. However, the uninformed agents who use OLS fail to take into account the fact that the relationship changes as they learn; their estimation procedure is based upon a misspecification of the situation.
I investigate two different regimes in which the uninformed agents use estimated regression coefficients in forecasting. In the first regime studied traders initially forecast rt by @(r, ] h,-,, pt) = a, + b,p,. They continue to use this forecasting rule for a long period, during which they run a linear OLS regression of rt on pt. While they use the original forecasting rule the actual relationship between price and return is rf = ai + b;p, + u,. As the length of the estimation period tends to infinity the estimated values of the regression coefficients converge almost surely to ah and b&. At some date all the uninformed traders simultaneously drop the initial forecasting rule2 and adopt the new rule ~(r,/h,_,,p,)=a,+b,p,, where a,=@, and b,=bb. They then start to re-estimate the regression coeffmients, ultimately reaching new probability limits a; and b; and changing the forecasting rule again.
After the mth change of forecasting rule the coefficients are (aWg b,,j, which are defined recursively by (a,, 6,) and the difference equations a,==(l+k)a*--a,-,,
The elementary theory of difference equations implies: .5) and (4.6), expectatiorts converge to rationality (in the sense that a, tends to a" and 6, tends to b*) ifand only z~lkl < 1.
In the second OLS procedure studied, traders revise their estimates each time a new data point is observed. The resulting, highly non-linear stochastic difference equations are hard to analyze. The problem is rendered tractable by reducing the number of coefficients estimated by one, by assuming that the traders know the means of (p,, rJ. If the uninformed traders believed the means to be (p, r), they would regress (rt -r) upon (p, These beliefs about the means of (p,, rJ are rational given the past history observed by the uninformed traders if and only if E(r, i h,-,) = r and E(p, / h,-,) = p. Since rf is independent of past history this requires that r=Er,. The following argument demonstrates that these two properties imply that for any E > 0, P(I b, -b" 1 > F infinitely often) = 0, and thus that h, tends to b" almost surely.
Let e be any positive number, let rr be any number in (0, 1) and let 6 and N be such that Property 2 holds. Let E be the event in which S, exceeds 181 at some finite date and j b, -b*i subsequently alternates between being less than 6 and greater than E infinitely often. Property I implies that, if there is a positive probability that ) b, -b* 1 > E infinitely often, then E has positive probability. It will be shown that E has probability zero.
Let E, be the event in which this alternion happens at least y1 times after S, > N. Formally E, is the event that the stopping time t, is finite, where t, is defined by t,=min{t:Jb,-b*I<&S,>N}, tn = min I lb,-b*l<&t>t,-,, t' (bi -b* ( > E for some i between t,-r and t, * Note that E,-, c E,, E = n ?I0 E,, and, from Property 1, P(E,) = 1.
Let A, be the event that Ibj-b*l > E and Ibi-b*l <6 for some finite i > j > t. Thus P(En+l 14>=P@tnl&)* The parameter k is clearly crucial. It is defined in (3.9), but is not given any interpretation. When the supply s, has zero variance (3.4) and (3.9) imply that k has a particularly simple form, k = (~~~~i~/(~j#i~. In this case, given a,-r and b,-, , the price is a linear function of E(r, j 1,) and a sufficient statistic for the information. Thus in the rational expectations equilibrium -a* c b*pt = E(r, / 1,). Here k is the equilibrium ratio of uninformed to tinformed demand and is non-negative. The period by period least squares learning rule is therefore stable. The process in which the forecasting rule is changed only when the estimates reach their probability limits is stable if the uninformed traders demand less than the informed traders in equilibrium, If var s, > 0, k can be negative if the return on the asset and its supply are positively correlated. From (3.9) the stability conditions can be reformulated as implies that -1 < k < 1 so both learning processes are stable, and implies that -1 < k, so period ordinary least squares learning is stable. Thus learning tends to generate instability if either the ratio N,B,/N,Bi is large so the uninformed traders dominate the market, or the equilibrium value of the regression coefficient of price on return b* is large,
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this paper suggest that a learning method can event~ali~ yield rational expectations even if it is based upon a misspeci~cation of the mode! in the situation when agents are learning. However-as one might expect-the stability properties of the system are different for different learning procedures, and instability seems to be a real possibility.
These results seem to lend weight to the rational expectations hypothesis. However, it must be borne in mind that expectations are not rational, and indeed are biased due to the misspecification of the model which is estimated, at all finite dates. Rational expectations are, if anything, a long run rather than a short run phenomenon. To complete that notation let (a, R, P) be the probability space on which all the random variables are defined, and let .* be the smallest sub-sigma field of on which (Ye, x1),..., (rl, xt) are measurable. Then 5 cF2 *. e and (c,, S,, u,, UJ is 6 but not &-, measurable.
If k f -1 the event in which b,_, tends to any limit apart ,from b" has probability zero.
The intuitive argument here is that if the coefficient used in forecasting b,-L converged to 6, the conditional expectation of r( -r would converge to ((I + k)b* -kb)(p,-p). Thus the OLS estimator would converge to (1 -t k)b" -kb. Unless b = b* this contradicts the original assumption that b tp, tends to b.
ProoJ
As jc, -c* j = j b,-, -b" / the lemma can be proved by showing that c, almost surely does not tend to any limit other than c*.
Suppose that there is an event of positive probability on which c, tends to c, c # 0 and c # c*. If this is so the strong law of large numbers implies that there is an event G of positive probability on which
implying that the right-hand side of (A-8) tends to -k(c -c*) while the lefthand side tends to c-c*.
This is impossible unless c = c*.
If c tends to 0 with positive probability, for any E > 0 there is a date y1 and event G' on which, for all t > n, Ict( < E, and using the strong law of large numbers From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality jf c (UiUJCi-,) j < (wp (+-i *:)"'. The argument is suggested by noting that, given any c,-, f 0, (A.9) implies that if S,-r is sufficiently large, c1 is likely to be closer to c* than c t--l. There are apparent difficulties when c,_, is close to zero. In these cases (vJc,-~)~ is likely to be large, and c, -c* N -k(c,-, -c*) N kc*. These difficulties are avoided by choosing f so that f (kc*) < f (-c*).
Lemmas I and 2 are used in the proof of Lemma 3. Thus if c1 is bounded, let -cl-r j tends to zero almost surely. From (Al 1) if S(c, -c*) tends to a limit and 1 c, -c,-, j tends to zero, c, tends to a limit, If I, is infinite c, is not in (g](S,), g2(So)) f or any t. In this case (A.12) im that, as c* is in (g,(S,), gASoN, et cannot tend to c". Thus if there is positive probability that to is infinite there is positive probability that c, tends to a limit other that c*. However, (Lemma I) the probability that c, tends to any limit other that c* is zero, so to is almost surely finite. Now define the sequence of stopping imes to, t, 9..W recursively by letting i,, be the first date after t,_, at which c, is in (e,(S,), g,(S,)). From (4.17), S, is non-decreasing with time, so Sfn > S, > 0. As (ct, S,) is Markov the argument used to establish that t, is finite establish that, if t, is finite, t, + I is almost surely finite. Thus t, is almost surely finite for all n. Finally note from (A.13) that as S, > S,, ( gI(SJ gZ(Stn)) is a subinterval of (g,(So), &(So)), so ctn is % (g,(S,), g2(S0)) for an almost surely infinite sequence of stopping times {t,}, which proves the lemma. 1 Property 1 is now established by proving Lemma 4. Using (A.14) this implies that there is, almost surely, a finite date u such that c" -6 < g,(S,) < c* < gz(SJ < c* + 6. There is no loss of generality in restricting attention to E < fc" (recall that c* is strictly positive). In this case These bounds will be used extensively later in the proof. (Here Df is the complement of the event Di in J2.) Thus, as required,
